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Abstract: “We’re all going to be starring in our own sit-coms, and they’ll be very strange sit-coms
too, like the inside of our heads.”—J. G. Ballard, Extreme Metaphors. Ballard’s prediction about the
possibility of projecting the inside of our own heads is highly illuminating in light of contemporary
discourses on participatory media culture and online video-sharing platforms. This is not least due
to the documented instances of violence and sexual deviance surrounding prominent figures on
YouTube that lend a considerable amount of credence to what Ballard described, in his 1977 short
story ‘The Intensive Care Unit’, as a ‘liberating affectlessness [that] allowed those who wished to
explore the fullest range of sexual possibility and paved the way for the day when a truly guilt-free
sexual perversity and, even, psychopathology might be enjoyed by all.’ This article examines
how Ballard’s preoccupation with this ‘liberating affectlessness’—or as he notably termed it in his
introduction to Crash, ‘the death of affect’—compares to the impetus that psychologists such as
Jonathan Rottenberg and Sheri L. Johnson place upon an ‘affective science’ approach to exploring
and treating psychopathology—an approach that they affirm has ‘tremendous potential to facilitate
scientific work on the role of emotions in psychopathology.’ This active interplay between emotion
and affect (or the calculated lack of) on one hand, and psychopathology on the other that Ballard
and Rottenberg and Johnson investigate from different angles also feeds into discourses on online
participatory media and the ways that users engage with online media. Specifically, this section of
the article will draw upon the roles of private and public spaces, and the breakdown of traditional
barriers between them, as well as the commercial factors that define and underpin this new media
culture. ‘The Intensive Care Unit’ and later novels such as Cocaine Nights (1996) play upon these
themes as a means of anticipating and demonstrating how, in Ballard’s fiction as well as in real-life
instances, psychopathology emerges in the breakdown of the barriers between lives lived excessively
on screen and the external, sensory and emotional world.
Keywords: Ballard; online participatory media; social media; YouTube; psychopathology; affect; emotion
1. Introduction
In 2013, the prominent news and entertainment site Buzzfeed posted an article with the
sensationalist claim that J. G. Ballard had ‘predicted social media’ (Lewis 2013) back in 1977, in an
article for Vogue entitled ‘The Future of the Future’. The section of Ballard’s essay Buzzfeed excitedly ran
with as central to their claim featured visions of ‘a computer trained to pick out only our best profiles,
our wittiest dialogue, our most affecting expressions filmed through the kindest filters, and then stitch
these together into a heightened re-enactment of the day (Ballard 1997a, p. 226).’ While Ballard’s
prescience in this instance is both amusing and impressive, there is far at more at play in his thinking
than an insightful prediction of surface-level, front-end mechanisms of social and online media such
as the Facebook news feed, Instagram filters, YouTube vlogs and Snapchat stories.
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In his response to the Buzzfeed article, Simon Sellars riffs on the deliberate complexities of Ballard’s
theories through a close reading of the fictional counterpart to ‘The Future of the Future’: the 1977
short story, ‘The Intensive Care Unit’. For Sellars, ‘The Intensive Care Unit’ encapsulates how:
‘Ballard could expose the vacuity and never-attainable levels of satisfaction that power the
logic of the consumerist engine, yet he was not above the thrill of it all, for he understood
the liberating charge that comes from total abandonment. He saw the capturing, framing
and enhancement of perversity by modern technology as beneficial, an unprecedented ‘back
door pass into the realm of psychopathology’ (Sellars 2013).
Like Sellars, this article will offer a reading of ‘The Intensive Care Unit’. However, it will do
so through the lens of contemporary theories on affect and social media, as well as the role that
what psychologists Jonathan Rottenberg and Sheri L. Johnson call ‘affective science’ plays in the
understanding and treatment of various psychopathologies. In the case of the former, Tony D. Sampson,
Darren Ellis and Stephen Maddison note that one of the fundamental challenges of examining affect
and social media is that it ‘is not as if the two can be easily separated—as if affect was something that
circulates and penetrates social media, rather than constituting its very being (Sampson et al. 2018,
p. 6)’.
By bringing in recent work in clinical psychology and the emerging area of affect and social
media, this article seeks to offer new insights into Ballard’s writing through the application of
clinical work on psychopathology and emotion to it, an area that is perhaps not as extensive as
one might expect. Exceptions to this, however, include Dan O’Hara’s essay ‘Reading Posture and
Gesture in Ballard’s Novels’, and Andrzej Gasiorek’s 2005 coda on Violence and Psychopathology.
One of the most intriguing threads of Gasiorek’s coda is how he captures Ballard’s awareness of
the gratuitous late twentieth-century violence that emerges when distinctions between literality and
metaphor collapse—concluding that, what ‘Ballard defends as the ‘morally free psychopathology of
metaphor [original emphasis], as an element in one’s dreams’, is, when carried over by those who
literalise metaphor into the domain where it has no place, an id-driven psychopathology that lays
waste to human life.’ (Gasiorek 2005, p. 212). O’Hara, meanwhile, charts the interplay between
psychopathology, technology and communication through the dual framework of Gregory Bateson’s
1956 psychological concept of the double bind, and R. D. Laing’s interpretation of that concept, namely
its ubiquity in the everyday life of the 1960s. He concludes that Ballard’s writing—especially his
later fiction—reveals ‘the metacommunicational contexts which we create, which conjoin inner space
with the external world, and which imprison us’ (O’Hara 2012, p. 118) and recognizes Ballard’s
identification of ‘a designed psychosphere in which the ‘death of affect’ is one of the consequences of
the psychological impasse in which our technological environments place us (O’Hara 2012, p. 118).’
Yet as well as aiming to establish the complex and fluid intersections at play between psychopathology,
affect theory, and social and online media, claims by the likes of Sampson, Ellis and Maddison
demonstrate an intriguing theoretical counterpoint to Ballard’s belief that a ‘death of affect’ was
brought about by the same mediated world of rapid technological development, mass media and
celebrity culture that led to him so astutely ‘predicting’ social media over forty years ago. For Ballard,
such an affectless realm offered fertile breeding ground for thrilling, dangerous and necessary senses
of deviance and perversity—something which represents another noteworthy comparison in light of
Rottenberg and Johnson’s affective approach to treating psychopathology. As such, this article will
investigate how effectively Ballard’s prescient thinking both reaffirms and challenges these discourses
and theoretical approaches. To do this, it will draw upon some high-profile instances involving
YouTubers and internet celebrities that not only demonstrate a marked, wilful deviance, but reveal
much about the collapse of any pre-existing distinctions between private and public lives, and online
and offline selves, in which a new psychopathology emerges.
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1.1. Psychopathology and Affect
The three objectives underpinning Rottenberg and Johnson’s collection of studies on emotion
and psychopathology are as follows: providing an overview of the most effective methodologies
from clinical experts ‘on major components of emotion, including self-report of experience, as well as
behaviour, cognition, and physiological response’ (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 7); identifying ‘how
emotion theory can inform treatment’ (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 7) of psychopathology; lastly,
illustrating ‘how emotion research has the potential to provide understanding of key mechanisms
in psychopathology (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 7)’ The necessity of delving into emotion
research is, they argue, due to a critical lacuna between the theoretical and the clinical when it comes
to studying psychopathology. Introducing their collection of studies, they speak frankly about how
‘scientific fragmentation has been acutely felt in the field of emotion, where there has been a wide
gulf between “basic” research on normative emotion functioning and “applied” research on clinical
disorders (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 4).’ Responding to this gap in their field, their ‘affective
science’ approach seeks to collapse this distinction with the hope that, in doing so, researchers and
clinicians alike will begin to ‘better understand both psychopathology and normal emotional variation
(Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 4)’.
The active and complex role that external environment plays in this interplay between emotion
and psychopathology is crucial, to the point that it informs the definition of psychopathology upon
which Rottenberg and Johnson foreground their work:
Although emotions can help us adapt successfully to the environment, psychopathology
reveals the darker side of emotion . . . On this darker side, emotional impulses are poorly
tuned to the environment: They arise in the wrong contexts, build to the wrong intensity,
and last for the wrong duration. When emotions go wrong, the consequences can be terrible
. . . emotional disturbance, in one form or another, is a central feature of psychopathology’.
(Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 3).
Additionally, the psychologists demonstrate an understanding of the fundamental complexities in
attempting to bridge the gap between emotional, theoretical and clinical responses to psychopathology.
The volatile, changeable nature of emotions and emotional disturbances are key here, as emotions ‘can
go wrong in so many ways, and these various forms of dysfunction are not easily described or arrayed
into a meaningful scheme.’ (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 4) This difficulty works right down to
questions of definition around emotion, and how these questions in turn relate to an understanding of
affect. Firstly, emotion:
is inherently a multifaceted construct. This is reflected both in definitions of emotion,
which typically contain multiple elements such as subjective experience, cognition, behaviour,
and physiology, as well as in wider discussions of emotion, which often draw on molar concepts
such as culture, development, evolution, or socialization. (Rottenberg and Johnson 2007, p. 5).
Framing a study on bipolar disorder, Johnson, June Gruber, and Lori R. Eisner offer an
interpretation of the differences between ‘emotions’ and ‘moods’, stating that while the latter tend ‘to be
long-lasting, diffuse, and not tied to a specific trigger, emotions are regarded as transient, acute responses
to specific environmental stimuli that involve coordinated subjective, behavioural, and physiological
components (Johnson et al. 2007, p. 124).’ To add a further layer of complexity, affect is outlined by
Humrichouse et al. as a state ‘encompassing both emotions and moods. It is what one is experiencing or
feeling, either pleasant or unpleasant, with varying levels of intensity, duration, and triggers or patterns
of activation (Humrichouse et al. 2007, p. 14).’ In addition to the aforementioned exploration into
bipolar disorder, there are several other pertinent examples of specific psychopathological disorders
that can be investigated using affective processes. One such example is Christopher J. Patrick’s study
into personality and neurobiology against the distinctive tropes of psychopathy, which is defined as:
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a severe personality syndrome that entails abnormalities in affective and interpersonal
functioning accompanied by marked behavioural deviance. Psychopathic individuals appear
charming and insouciant and exhibit a striking absence of guilt, remorse, or empathetic
concern for others. These characteristics have led theorists to postulate a core underlying
affective deficit in psychopathy (Patrick 2007, p. 125).
The idea of a ‘core underlying affective deficit’ existing in psychopathic individuals brings
Ballard’s connection between a collective ‘death of affect’ and psychopathology back into sharp focus.
However, just as fundamental difficulties reveal themselves through the study of emotion, affect and
psychopathology (working right down to a definitional level), Ballard’s attitudes toward the causal
relationship between a wholly mediated environment and psychopathology remain deliberately
complex and changeable. Particularly intriguing are the ideas around individuals responding
poorly to such environments and the subsequent differentiating from ‘normal’ emotional responses;
the following sections of this article will explore how, in his fiction, Ballard playfully pushes the
subjectivity of these terms.
1.2. Affect and Online Participatory Media
Reading an affective turn in studies of online participatory media as a clear-cut distinction from
Ballard’s ideas on the death of affect is not the aim here. The question of whether causality between
psychopathology on one hand, and online and social media on the other, arises from a death of affect
or an overabundance of negative affect is a hugely complex one. This is not least because online media
does not exist in isolation as a technological development. It is not even merely because online media
is actively and perniciously connected to celebrity culture and consumption, but rather because it
is fundamentally redefining these aspects of the contemporary mediated landscape as well as also
redefining traditional notions of family, and boundaries between public and private spaces.
The central role online media plays in the construction and very basis of the contemporary
mediated world is paralleled by the inseparability of affect and social and online media. In charting
this parallel, Ian Tucker hints at the psychological ramifications of such developments:
Digital media play an increasingly active role in conditioning the environmental contexts
of psychological life. Media act as the environmental side of the “more than one” reality of
subjective life. Therefore, emotions are becoming with digital media rather than being
controlled and dominated by them [original emphasis]. This is a useful conceptual
development because it provides a new perspective to digital media analysis in relation
to affect and emotion. We see that living with digital media is by definition affective
[original emphasis] (Tucker 2018, pp. 39–40).
If psychopathology is most likely to stem from a negative or poorly-tuned response to this
digitally-mediated, affective environment, it does not take too much of an imaginative leap to
consider how affect is directly linked to the social and cultural expectations of participation in
this environment. This could be through Tweeting, Instagramming, or even heeding YouTube’s
encouragement to ‘Broadcast Yourself’; however, the power of the dopamine hit of online validation
can, almost imperceptibly, transform into distinctly negative affective responses. Ellis and Maddison
put it bluntly: due to ‘the overwhelming amount of participation on social media, it is not surprising
at all that it often invokes insecurity and anxiety (Ellis and Maddison 2018, p. 99).’ Rebecca Coleman
riffs on the pressures associated with this level of participation by unpacking the self-descriptions of
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram as a method of framing these platforms as ‘hyper-connected, always
on, affective and non-representational, and involved in re-working boundaries between production
and consumption, and between temporalities and spatialities (Coleman 2018, p. 67)’.
These pressures to interact and participate—to throw oneself into this ‘hyper-connected, always
on’ environment—are heightened in light of online celebrity culture. Greg Singh has undertaken
excellent work exploring the intersection between ‘celebrity, technology and selfhood in popular
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culture’ (Singh 2017, p. 169), and the following discussion will follow his lead by taking YouTube as the
platform from which to most effectively discuss online celebrity and its associated psychopathologies.
In Singh’s view, the video-sharing website functions ‘as the popular media platform for online
celebrity existing today’ [original emphasis] (Singh 2017, p. 169), and as such forms the basis for his
‘post-Jungian’ approach to analysing the behaviour of online celebrities in addition to that of the fans
and detractors of those celebrities. Tellingly, the most striking way in which Singh posits celebrity
culture and celebrity interactions have been redefined by platforms like YouTube has a distinctly
psychopathological edge to it:
Perhaps the most productive tension in the context of YouTube personalities and celebrity
cultures is the blurred distinction between public and private in the identification,
construction and mobilisation of the self. The immediacy and sheer speed of exchange,
amplified through emotionally-charged celebrity culture, and engaged with by consumers
of popular culture who are not only fans (and anti-fans, haters) of the celebrity figures
themselves, means that consumer-users tend to be adept with the discourses featured in
the communicative practices of platforms. Things tend to escalate very quickly under such
intense circumstances (Singh 2017, p. 175).
Singh’s ideas on the ‘productive tension’ inherent in the construction of the self are evocative
of Gasiorek’s reading of Ballard’s late texts, which themselves ‘describe a subjectivity so thoroughly
imbricated in technological networks of power that no meaning exists in the conception of an authentic
self (Gasiorek 2005, p. 208).’ This ‘productive tension’, and its emergence in the collapsing of
distinctions between public and private spaces, has also long been a consideration of theoretical
work on YouTube and video-sharing platforms. Investigating the still-formative platform back in 2009,
Michael Strangelove was quick to realise the new duality that could and would come to define the
formerly private space of the family home, as well as the profound psychological repercussions of
this. Indeed, Strangelove’s opening gambit in his chapter on ‘The Home and Family on YouTube’—the
proclamation that the ‘first studio of this mass age of amateur video is the home’ (Strangelove 2010,
p. 41), and that ‘the domestic geography of the home forms part of the unconscious of this new mode
of mass moviemaking’ (Strangelove 2010, p. 41)—reads as positively Ballardian. As a prolific YouTuber
himself, Strangelove demonstrates a clear recognition of the ‘highly seductive’ (Strangelove 2010, p. 47)
allure of YouTube. Again, it is the participatory aspect of this new media that Strangelove realises
is so powerful; he outlines how the validating prospect of having videos re-blogged or commented
on contributes to an overwhelming ‘aesthetic of attraction’ (Strangelove 2010, p. 47). Yet despite—or
perhaps because of—his early engagement with and immersion into the world of YouTube, Strangelove’s
work ultimately strikes a distinct note of caution, particularly with regard to this sudden blurring between
private and public selves, asserting that all too often the practice of uploading home movies descends into
a ‘disturbing and harmful form of media practice’ (Strangelove 2010, p. 52). Like Ballard, he cites the
deviant possibilities of the technology as central to the formation of his views:
YouTube is a new form of looking glass; it enables others to apply deviant labels to anyone,
which may lead individuals to internalize those labels. Such attitudinal changes in a person’s
self-concept may be temporary or permanent. It is not yet certain if the looking-glass effect
occurs through the Internet’s mediated social environments (Strangelove 2010, p. 58).
Strangelove’s 2009 assessment is necessarily speculative, as well as remaining free from any
Ballardian thrill of being through this particular looking glass. However, the 2017 controversy
surrounding the DaddyOFive YouTube channel illuminates the theories of Strangelove and Singh.
DaddyOFive centred on Maryland parents Michael and Heather Martin, and the ‘pranks’ that they and
their four oldest children would periodically play on their unsuspecting youngest child, Cody. On one
level, the DaddyOFive videos are clearly representative of Strangelove’s early concern around how
collapsing public and private spaces and selves were already constituting a ‘dangerous and harmful
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media form of media practice’, as in reality the ‘pranks’ played on Cody amount to little more than
emotional and physical abuse.
Moreover, the nature of the discourse that played out in the wake of the DaddyOFive ‘pranking’
videos represents a typical example of the ‘positive tension’ that Singh originally formulated as a
theoretical response to the similarly fractious #GamerGate scandal. Rapid, emotionally-charged
responses between fans of the Martins’ channel (of which there were many), the conflation of those
who showed concern for Cody Martin’s wellbeing with so-called ‘haters’, as well as video responses
from other prominent YouTubers like Philip DeFranco (2017) and the Martins themselves ratcheted
up the intense emotional responses and brought into focus the ways in which the Martins’ family
unit was constructed and put on display for millions of viewers. Indeed, the power dynamics on
display in the DaddyOFive videos—the parents and older siblings as perpetrators of the ‘pranks’; the
youngest child as perpetual victim of them—offer ample reason for Strangelove’s cautious uncertainty
of the looking glass effect of this mediated environment. Yet if ‘it’s just a prank, bro’ (DeFranco 2017),
as Michael Martin claims, then any long-term, real-world emotional consequences should not be an
issue. Again, Singh tackles this question of the social and contextual murkiness of this section of online
media culture by focusing on the:
treatment of performativity offered in any analysis of online social interactions where
real-world consequences pertain. Through what might be described as a proxemics of
YouTube and other platforms where social interaction of this kind proliferates, social
psychology approaches serve to illustrate the complexities of social context cues, level of
communication fidelity, non-verbal communications clarity, absence of eye-contact in
non-visual communications forms, and the exaggerated effect of responsibility deferral
through deindividuation (Singh 2018, p. 107).
The significance and complexity of these various and often incredibly subtle forms of technological
communication can be traced right back to Gregory Bateson’s concept of the double bind. Dan O’Hara
describes the ‘mutually contradictory messages’ that are fundamental to any power dynamic in which
a subject finds themselves psychologically trapped, by something such as familial ties: ‘one of these
messages is verbal, usually an injunction not [original emphasis] to do something, with an implied or
explicit threat. The other message is more abstract, contextual, perhaps an intimation of love, and is
non-verbal (O’Hara 2012, p. 108)’. Consequently, the Martins’ video response to their ‘haters’ (clips
from which are included in DeFranco’s subsequent response to that video; the DaddyOFive channel
is defunct as of July 2018) provides a further rich example of the way in which a typical, supposedly
loving family unit is constructed for the camera as a means of attempting to negate any real-world
psychological consequences, and defer any responsibility. Curiously, the evidence the Martins provide
as a means of this deferral of responsibility and reinforcing of the family unit is the number of gifts
and merchandise they are inundated with from fans; the belief in the power of these gifts hints at the
curious role that a conspicuous consumption plays in these online social interactions and controversies.
For all that online media are redefining notions of celebrity, psychopathologies can also emerge as
a consequence of hegemonic ideas around celebrity continuing to exist on these newer media platforms.
Sophie Bishop takes the UK beauty vlogging industry as an archetype for this continuation:
The “A List” vloggers are overwhelmingly white, young, conventionally attractive and
middle class. They have successfully negotiated the YouTube algorithm and gained
millions of loyal subscribers on the video sharing platform. They are the visible girls:
luminescent on the YouTube platform, on billboards paid for by YouTube, in magazines and
L’Oreal commercials (Bishop 2018, p. 122).
Bishop convincingly argues how the algorithmic upholding of conventional ideals of fame and
celebrity directly juxtaposes the suggestion of YouTube as a truly participatory online platform, as ‘by
definition, participatory media allows any user to design, create and publish their diverse content
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(Bishop 2018, p. 124).’ Despite that principle, in the case of monetised YouTube channels, ‘a small
number of A List participants are promoted by a platform’s algorithms, with the majority of users
relegated to the long tail of backwater search results’ (Bishop 2018, p. 124). Inevitably there are negative
consequences for those users who do not conform to such ideals, as ‘YouTube’s algorithmic signals
punish deviant content, straying from their commercial genre, and this too is a form of symbolic
violence (Bishop 2018, p. 125)’.
The question that Bishop’s assessment raises centres upon what happens when a user whose
channel and content do not conform to these algorithmic and hegemonic requirements opts to respond
in a way that shatters distinctions between the online and external worlds. In April 2018, YouTuber
Nasim Najafi Aghdam opened fire at YouTube’s headquarters in San Bruno, California, injuring three
employees before turning her gun on herself. Aghdam’s actions were motivated by the demonetisation
and apparent censorship of her channel; as well as the racial undertones in YouTube’s algorithm,
recurring themes in her videos, such as images of extreme animal cruelty as a means of advocating
animal rights and veganism, corroborate Bishop’s point on the symbolic violence perpetrated by
YouTube against seemingly ‘deviant’, uncommercial content.
1.3. J. G. Ballard: Predicting the Psychopathology of Social Media?
The fear and total unwillingness to tolerate anything that has even a hint of deviance to it
that Sophie Bishop articulates so well within the framework of YouTube’s insidious algorithms is,
for Ballard, characteristic of post-war Western society. If one were to read Nasim Aghdam as a
Ballardian figure based on this, then Ballard’s assessment of the Baader-Meinhof’s motives becomes
highly revealing:
If you’re brought up in one of these suburbs around a German city, where nothing is ever
allowed out of place, where because they were so terrified by the experiences of World
War II and the Nazi epoch, they’d gone to any length to make certain everyone is happy,
everyone in school or kindergarten is dutifully equipped so there would be no deviance and
no problems later. If you have a world like that, without any real kind of freedom of the
spirit, the only freedom to be found is in madness . . . in a completely sane world, madness is
the only freedom! (Ballard 2012e, p. 154).
For Ballard, the embracing of madness reveals a profound sense of paranoia and desperation,
but for all that, the wilful deviance that comes with embracing madness is hugely liberating and
vitally necessary. In an affective, psychopathological sense, this kind of deviant, extremely violent
response might well represent what Rottenberg and Johnson define as a poor emotional response
to one’s external environment. Ballard, however, is decidedly more ambiguous in how he views
such psychopathological tendencies. Even though Ballard believes ‘all we’ve got left is our own
psychopathology. It’s the only freedom we have—that’s a dangerous state of affairs’ (Ballard 2012a,
p. 400), psychopathology is yet becoming ‘the last repository of the human imagination . . . [it] should
be kept alive’ (Ballard 2012d, p. 229). The attendant senses of very real danger and necessary
imaginative capabilities are inseparable.
The technological, media and communications landscape is, of course, crucial to the development
and exploration of Ballard’s ideas and the complexities inherent within them. Speaking in 1979,
Ballard’s views on the possibilities that could be realised through technological and media innovations
reveal similarities to Rottenberg and Johnson’s concerns around poor individual responses to
external environments:
with the new multimedia potential of your own computerised TV studio, where limitless
simulations can be played out in totally convincing style, one will be able to explore, in a
wholly benign and harmless way, every type of impulse—impulses so deviant that they
might have seemed, say to our parents, to be completely corrupt and degenerate . . . we’ll
shortly be moving into a realm where we will be able to take for granted the existence of
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these seemingly deviant interests and through the limitless powers of our home computers
and TV we will be granted universes of experience which today seem to belong to the dark
side of so-called civilised behaviour (Ballard 2012b, pp. 128–29).
The enticing possibility of moving to the dark side offers an inversion of Rottenberg and Johnson’s
insistence that the ‘darker side of emotion’ is symptomatic of psychopathology and would require
treatment. This continued exploration of the compelling, deviant potential in embracing ‘the dark
side of so-called civilised behaviour’ defines Ballard’s later novels and their psychopathic anti-heroes.
In Cocaine Nights (1996), Bobby Crawford continues the blueprint set out by Vaughan; Ballard (1997b)
describes the two as ‘deviant messiahs. They’re sort of well-intentioned psychopaths. They’re
public-spirited psychopaths, a very curious blend. They genuinely want to do good and show
people the truth (Ballard 2012c, p. 326)’.
Ballard states that one of the central aims of his later fiction was ‘exploring the psychopathology of
everyday life and trying to uncover those secret engines which keep us moving (Ballard 2012a, p. 397).’
Published a decade prior to the inception of YouTube, the huge significance placed upon participating
in amateur and home filmmaking in Cocaine Nights is particularly forceful. Moreover, the similarities
between these yet-to-come online media platforms and the Laingian everyday psychopathology that
plays out in Ballard’s novel is illuminated by Singh’s theories around the ways ‘social media platforms,
although pregnant with affirmative possibilities for political transgression, action and subversion,
tend also to exacerbate the otherwise “normal” pathological split between an “inner self” and a
generalized deadness of the embodied “false-self”’ (Singh 2018, p. 108).
The sweltering, stifling backdrop of Estrella de Mar and the expats languishing within it provide
the perfect testing ground for an experiment on how active participation in home moviemaking and
this everyday psychopathology become thrillingly yet dangerously intertwined. Charles Prentice’s
initial impressions of the holiday resort set up Estrella de Mar as a necessary foil, through ‘the
timelessness of a world beyond boredom, with no past, no future and a diminishing present. Perhaps
this was what a leisure-dominated future would resemble? Nothing could ever happen in this affectless
realm, where entropic drift calmed the surfaces of a thousand swimming pools (Ballard 1997b, p. 35).’
Just as Rebecca Coleman notes how social networking sites redefine understood temporalities as a
way of cranking up the pressure to remain ‘hyper-connected, always on’, so the initial timelessness
of Estrella de Mar is directly linked to its affectlessness. With this in mind, Bobby Crawford enters
the novel as an embodiment of the pressures associated with online participatory media and its
attendant psychopathologies. If the latter can be read through his wonderfully mindless criminality,
Paula Hamilton most effectively recognises the importance of active participation that he demands:
‘You’re used to being an observer, and Bobby Crawford likes everyone to take part (Ballard 1997b,
p. 200).’ As the plot develops, Prentice is confronted with what participation in the new life of Estrella
de Mar entails, and learns the centrality of video to this:
Crawford closed his eyes to the thought. ‘That’s not the kind of club I have in mind. People
have to learn to switch off their TV sets. I want a club where people make their own films,
learn how to storyboard a narrative, how to handle close-ups, dollies, pans and tracking
shots. Film is the way we see our world, Charles’ (Ballard 1997b, p. 261).
In addition to recalling the definition of a psychopath outlined by Christopher J. Patrick, Crawford
plays a crucial role when it comes to Ballard’s reworking of the idea that embracing the darker
side of one’s emotions and urges represents a ‘poor’ or socially unacceptable response to a given
external environment. Here, the darker side of emotion is what allows characters to transcend their
timeless, affectless realms in ways that are equally exhilarating and deviant. Additionally, Crawford’s
convincingness in his role of the everyday, benevolent psychopath marks him out as a precursor to
the adeptness with which—as Singh argues—online celebrities and other users participate in and
manipulate discourses and situations on online media platforms.
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1.4. The Intensive Care Unit
Ballard’s prediction regarding the intrinsically ‘benign and harmless’ nature of online interactions
can, with the benefit of a 2019 perspective, be undermined with relative ease (and all too many
examples); indeed, Greg Singh’s nuanced point on the dangerous and damaging murkiness between
online and external social conventions works well to this effect. Nevertheless, the complexities and
changeability of Ballard’s thinking means any potential prescience should not be dismissed so quickly.
‘The Intensive Care Unit’ not only offers a playful engagement with the idea of ‘benign and harmless’
online relationships, but also more than an insinuation that Ballard maintains a full awareness of the
dangers, as well as the possibilities, that arise when all sense of the affective distinctions between
screen-based and sensuous worlds come crashing down.
An overwhelming sense of pride and hope emanates from the narrator and patriarch of ‘The
Intensive Care Unit’ when he muses over the impending final, fatal conflict between himself, his wife
and children. He shows an immediate awareness that ‘this film will be the ultimate home movie, and I
only hope that whoever watches it again will gain some idea of the immense affection I feel for my
wife, and for my son and daughter, and of the unique affection that they, in their unique way, feel for
me (Ballard 1994, p. 195).’ The sentiment feels disconcertingly close to that expressed by Michael
Martin, who utilised a crucial part of the discourse of an online scandal—the video response to those
he deemed his ‘haters’—to reaffirm his love for his family (DeFranco 2017). Not only this, the narrator
broaches the central, unanswered, question that dominates Ballard’s short story: just who is watching
this battle play out? It hints at the existence of a potential audience of millions—as the DaddyOFive
YouTube channel had—exploring their own psychopathological urges through the ‘intensive care
unit’ of this one family. This uneasy feeling is compounded by the narrator’s acute awareness of the
necessary performativity and stylization of this final scene, and the role that the video camera plays
within this.
The immersion of himself and his family into this immediate, violent and overtly sensory and
emotional world ostensibly represents a complete departure from the narrator’s previous life. Even if
it is at an unconscious level, however, it also demonstrates the desperate necessity of getting beyond
an entirely mediated, affectless existence. The narrator’s first, abortive meeting with his wife prompts
the—too late—realisation of the distinctions that had existed between screen-based and external,
sensory worlds. More than that, though, the narrator’s previous existence in a wholly mediated,
televisual realm can now only be defined in relation to the grotesque, perverse intricacies of human
physicality and directly experienced emotion:
True closeness, I now knew, was television closeness—the intimacy of the zoom lens,
the throat microphone, the close-up itself. On the television screen there were no body
odours or strained breathing, no pupil contractions and facial reflexes, no mutual sizing up
of emotions and advantage, no distrust and insecurity (Ballard 1994, pp. 203–4).
The realisation undermines the narrator’s renowned paediatric work up until that point, in which he
has established the family unit as a ‘fundamental unit . . . of intensive care’ (Ballard 1994, p. 201) through
urging ‘the installation of more cameras throughout the homes of family members’ (Ballard 1994, p. 201).
His thesis is that the ubiquitous presence of the camera will culminate in a ‘liberating affectlessness
[which] allowed those who so wished to explore the fullest range of sexual possibility and paved
the way for the day when a truly guilt-free sexual perversity and, even, psychopathology might
be enjoyed by all (Ballard 1994, p. 199).’ This theoretical standpoint offers a notably similar—and
as convincing—sentiment to the suggestion that the playing out of family ‘pranks’ and the online
distribution of formerly private moments will have no bearing or consequences on the external world
and its social contexts.
As the story closes, we find the narrator ‘smiling at them affectionately, rage thickening the
blood in my throat, I am only aware of my feelings of unbounded love (Ballard 1994, p. 205).’
Ballard skilfully and playfully takes the narrator’s previous thesis apart through the total, irreparable
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breakdown of the family’s distinct screen-based relationships to one another. The intense, ambiguous
emotional state of the narrator as the story ends paints an extremely vivid fictional picture of the
emotional disturbances that underpin Rottenberg and Johnson’s definition of psychopathology. It also
foreshadows predictions from the likes of Strangelove by providing a prescient awareness of why
the home movie would go on to become one of the most potentially damaging yet compelling—and
crucially, extremely popular—genres of online video in the twenty-first century.
2. Conclusions
Everybody will be doing it, everybody will be living inside a TV studio. We’re all going to
be starring in our own sit-coms, and they’ll be very strange sit-coms too, like the inside of
our heads (Ballard 2012e, p. 155).
The starring roles that we all play in our own ‘very strange sit-coms’ are not limited to sharing
videos of ourselves online, but rather they incorporate mass participation in online and social media
discourses more broadly. Ballard goes further than offering a neat prediction of the front-of-house
features of various social media sites; instead, he captures the curious dynamic between the collective
fascination with online media and the intense social and cultural pressure to participate, as well as the
psychopathological ramifications of this dynamic. Even with an understanding of the negative affect
that constitutes a huge part of online media, Darren Ellis and Stephen Maddison acknowledge that:
Utility and enjoyment seem to outweigh the insecurity and anxiety that social media can
provoke. The affective atmospheres of social media that contain insecurity and anxiety
among many other affects do little to perturb participation. We love it! The trade-off seems
worth it. Or perhaps there seems so little that can be done to stop it, we might as well join in,
as avoidance may be even more difficult and dangerous (Ellis and Maddison 2018, p. 100).
The question of whether various forms of online media contribute to a contemporary death of
affect, or whether they serve to drag us away from a mediated, affectless realm remains unsurprisingly
unclear, given the complexity of Ballard’s own views on the interplay between technology, affect and
psychopathology. On one hand, the promises of harmlessly indulging in one’s most deviant impulses
without any external social or sensory consequences, or transcending hegemonic celebrity culture
through these new platforms can fall apart with extreme results. The cases of DaddyOFive and Nasim
Aghdam reveal the psychopathologies that emerge upon the complete blurring of online and external
selves. Indeed, media coverage of Aghdam in the wake of the YouTube shooting painted a portrait of
an eccentric, deranged individual with an intense hatred of YouTube; the similarities between Kingdom
Come’s (2006) Duncan Christie and his attitudes towards the MetroCentre felt chillingly apparent.
For all of these psychopathological pitfalls, however, Ballard fixates upon the thrilling, deviant
potential of ubiquitous video sharing in Cocaine Nights and ‘The Intensive Care Unit’. In these texts,
participation in a hyper-connected form of moviemaking is put forward as the only chance to escape
the eternal tedium of our contemporary mediated world. For all of the paranoid, desperate violence
and sexual deviance that may arise, it is left to a note from Ballard’s ultimate treatise on the media
landscape of the twentieth-century—The Atrocity Exhibition (1970)—to have the final word: ‘given the
unlimited opportunities which the media landscape now offers to the wayward imagination, I feel we
should immerse ourselves in the most destructive element, ourselves, and swim (Ballard 2014, p. 37)’.
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